Abstract
Traditional analysis of tax reform treats market behaviour as arising out of individual utility maximisation. In this paper, behaviour is modelled as the Pareto-efficient outcome of a family decision process. Conditions for the existence of a feasible, Pareto-improving tax change are presented and contrasted with those that obtain in the individualistic case. The consequences of treating households as a single individual are also discussed.
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