Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to conduct a systematic review of the factors that shape tax morale. A large range of random explanatory variables identified in the literature as determinants of tax morale are synthesised and structured by drawing inspiration from the institutional theory.Design/methodology/approachTo do this, a systematic search has been conducted using a library catalogue which provides access to more than 400 databases.FindingsThe finding is that the institutional theory provides a suitable theoretical basis to explore tax morale. Indeed, all the factors until now identified as determinants of tax morale (except the control variables/socio-demographic characteristics) can be categorised either as belonging to formal institutions or to informal institutions. The most salient factor is trust, with both vertical and horizontal trust positively related to tax morale.Research limitations/implicationsThe outcome is a call for a more nuanced understanding of not only the effect of formal and informal institutions on tax morale but also how formal and informal institutions interact and alter each other and, consequently, affect tax morale.Practical implicationsThe paper seeks to encourage governments to start recognising that as low tax morale arises when a gap exists between formal and informal institutions, they need to design policy measures aimed to reduce this gap, rather than persisting with deterrence measures.Originality/valueThis is the first systematic review of the factors that influence tax morale using an institutionalist lens.

Highlights

  • Tax compliance has been extensively researched and yet, the question of why people pay taxes remains only partially answered

  • Conclusions and policy implications This paper has provided a systematic review of the factors related to tax morale

  • Drawing inspiration from the institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990), tax morale has been viewed in this paper primarily to result from the interaction between formal and informal institutions

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Summary

Introduction

Tax compliance has been extensively researched and yet, the question of why people pay taxes remains only partially answered. The model assumes that tax payers are rational actors who seek to maximise the utility of their taxable income by weighting the benefits and the cost of compliance with the utility of tax non-compliance. As such, they will be non-compliant when the expected penalty and probability of being caught are rather small compared to the utility gained by non-compliance. The governments sought to ensure that the utility of non-compliance is outweighed by the cost of non-compliance and increased the penalties and the perceived probability of detection of the non-compliant taxpayers (Williams, 2014; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, 2017a). The first to recognise that the model does not capture

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