Abstract
High taxes and generous social benefits are often blamed for causing unemployment. The conventional view is that if taxes on labour are (too) high, jobs will be lost and that generous social benefits will exert an upward pressure on unions' wage claims. In the case where unions co-ordinate their wage bargaining strategy, this need not be the case. A simple model is used to illustrate the effects of the tax rate level and tax internalization on unions' wage bargaining strategy. A high marginal tax rate along with endogeneity of the average tax rate shifts the union's trade-off between wages and employment in favour of the latter. These shifts may have contributed to the success of the so-called ‘polder model’ or ‘tulip model’ of the Netherlands.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
