Abstract

We investigate the price effect of an excise tax in a duopoly setting. Previous studies have considered the Cournot and Bertrand models but ignore the Cournot–Bertrand model in which one firm competes in output and the other firm competes in price. This omission is important because Cournot–Bertrand behavior is observed in the real world, and the Cournot–Bertrand model provides dramatically different results. Unlike in the Cournot and Bertrand models, we find that firms in the same industry have different pass-through rates in the Cournot–Bertrand model even when they face identical demand and cost conditions. This provides another reason why tax incidence policy is so complex.

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