Tax Compliance among Managers: Evidence from Randomized Audits1

Abstract

Abstract Earlier studies of individuals’ law-abiding behavior find significant effects of home country corruption level on compliance. In our study of manager’s tax compliance, we use data from random audits and find associations between tax compliance and the use of an external accountant, age, manager’s place of origin and employees’ conflict exposure, but no effect from a manager’s own conflict exposure, nor Corruption Perception Index scores. The use of an external accountant seems to commit managers to comply with reporting requirements. Our findings suggest that factors such as managers’ age and company characteristics are important in understanding manager compliance. To study whether other mechanisms not previously tested may provide explanatory power, we specify two machinelearning models, which confirm our findings, but also suggest other associations. Nontechnical summary Our study examines tax compliance among managers using data from random audits. We found associations between tax compliance and the use of an external accountant, age, manager’s place of origin and employees’ conflict exposure. However, the manager’s own conflict exposure and corruption levels in their home country did not affect compliance. External accountants seem to encourage managers to comply with tax rules. Machine-learning models confirmed these findings and suggested other relevant factors.