Abstract

Tax competition is a phenomenon directly related to globalization processes, especially to the growth of international mobility of employees and capital. Liberalization of labor and capital factors flow and decline of transaction costs account for the fact that individuals as well as capital seek attractive jurisdictions for their deposits, not only at home but also abroad. Theoretically, lowering tax rates does not have to result in lower budget revenue, as due to the flow of labor and capital factors, tax base will grow. However, if (theoretically) all EU countries decide to lower personal tax rates, the relative attractiveness of countries for PIT taxpayers (who may be treated as investors) will remain unchanged, while their budget revenues will decline. The tax income decline caused by lowering rates at unchanged tax base accounts for a situation when the country can allocate less money to accomplish their tasks of providing public goods. Mobile production factors (labor and capital) may easily be located in countries with low tax rates, which limits the possibility of increasing their taxation. The essence of tax competition often boils down to the belief that small tax burdens are the main factor determining the development of a given territory and its perception as an attractive place for final tax settlement.

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