Abstract
Screening talent to appropriately assign tasks among agents is an important organizational decision. In this paper, we compare the efficacies of absolute and relative evaluation systems in identifying agent talent when information asymmetry is present. We identify conditions under which the firm prefers absolute evaluation. We also find that relative evaluation schemes are more susceptible to manipulation activities by agents. These findings support the use of absolute evaluation even though such a system discretizes available data by classifying agent output into performance buckets such as pass or fail. We discuss empirical implications.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
