Tarski’s Guilty Secret: Compositionality

Abstract

Tarski has exerted enormous influence not only on the development of mathematical logic, but on twentieth-century philosophy and philosophical analysis. This influence has been twofold, with the two components pulling in a sense in opposite directions. A comparison with the influence of the Vienna Circle provides an instructive vantage point in viewing Tarski’s influence. On the one hand, Tarski has provided powerful tools for logical analysis in philosophy. His first and most important contribution was to show that — and how — the crucial semantical concept of truth can be defined for various formal languages. They include the most central types of language used and studied by twentieth century logicians and philosophers. The subsequent work by Tarski and his school in creating contemporary model theory in its narrow sense as a branch of technical logic has likewise enriched tremendously the conceptual arsenal of philosophers. The extent and depth of Tarski’s influence is in fact easily underestimated. In comparison, Carnap’s well-known books in logical syntax and logical semantics (1934, 1947) did not in the same way contribute to the logical techniques that philosophers might find useful. A large part of Tarski’s influence lies in facilitating a switch of emphasis from purely syntactical to model-theoretical, semantical methods. It was Godel’s and Tarski’s early work that forced logicians and philosophers for the first time to take seriously the distinction between semantical (model-theoretical) and syntactical concepts and methods. The general theoretical implications of the distinction were not realized at once. In the light of hindsight, it is for instance quite striking that Tarski still in his classical monograph repeatedly assimilates to each other the task of defining truth for some part of mathematics or logic and axiomatizing its truths in a sense that involves explicit syntactical rules of inference. It was nevertheless Tarski more than anyone else who began to develop and exploit systematically model-theoretical concepts in logical theory. In comparison, Godel never developed systematically the model-theoretical aspects of logic. Others, for instance Quine, stubbornly remained within the syntactical tradition. Carnap, who did switch his attention from the syntactical to a semantical approach, was not powerful enough a logician to create a sufficiently rich store of model-theoretical techniques and ideas to be equally helpful in philosophical analysis. In contrast, several major developments in analytic philosophy have had their starting points in Tarski’s ideas. Well-known cases in point are Davidson’s truth-conditional semantics and the possible worlds semantics developed by Tarski’s favorite former student Richard Montague (1970).