Abstract
The correspondence theory of truth is one of the most venerable philosophical theses. Yet it was known almost from the beginning to entail the antinomy of the liar. This antinomy affects any use of the word “true,” not only the use which the correspondence theorist intends. A definition of truth for formalized languages which avoids the antinomy was not formulated before 1931. Tarski's proposal of that year uses an ingenious device. His definition concerns the truth or falsity of the sentences of one language, the object language, but it is given in a different language, the metalanguage. Adapting this definition to natural languages poses some problems, but let us assume they do not exist. Then we may freely apply the word “true” even to sentences of natural languages. We need have no fear of getting involved in antinomies. The use of the word “true” has been rehabilitated. But what about the correspondence theory? Has it too been rehabilitated? Many philosophers claim it has, in particular Karl Popper and his followers. But whether this is so depends of course on what exactly the correspondence theory asserts.
Published Version
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