TARP: Ticket-based address resolution protocol

Abstract

IP networks fundamentally rely on the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) for proper operation. Unfortunately, vulnerabilities in ARP enable a raft of Internet Protocol (IP)-based impersonation, man-in-the-middle, or Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Proposed countermeasures to these vulnerabilities have yet to simultaneously address backward compatibility and cost requirements. This paper introduces the Ticket-based Address Resolution Protocol (TARP). TARP implements security by distributing centrally issued secure IP/Medium Access Control (MAC) address mapping attestations through existing ARP messages. We detail TARP and its implementation within the Linux operating system. We also detail the integration of TARP with the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) for dynamic ticket distribution. Our experimental analysis shows that TARP improves the costs of implementing ARP security by as much as two orders of magnitude over existing protocols. We conclude by exploring a range of operational issues associated with deploying and administering ARP security.