Abstract
Trade distortions are the endogenous outcome of lobbying behavior by pressure groups and the response of regulators to these pressures. Using numerical simulation, this problem is solved in the context of general equilibrium with three sectors: nontradeables, exports, and imports. The results show that the nontradeables scctor does not lobby directly but generally benefits from the lobbying efforts of the tradeables sectors, particularly when services are wasted in rent-seeking struggles. They also show that tradeables sectors which are more rigid and produce goods with higher income elasticities and lower budget shares tend to lobby more and to gain trade protection.
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