Tarifautonomie als europäisches Gerechtigkeitsdilemma – Kritik und Lösungsmodell

Abstract

The European Union is a cooperative club to generate benefits for all member states. In order to do justice to the different preferences of the members, the EU was only given specific and unanimously decided competences. After the welfare economist Vilfredo Pareto, a Pareto-optimal state is created in the internal market, which is named after him. However, as a non-cooperative actor in areas without mandates (collective bargaining autonomy), the ECJ creates a Pareto deterioration, although it is secured as a central labor market policy in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 28 CRCh). The core content of Article 9(3) of the Basic Law, protected by the Federal Constitutional Court, also falls victim to the ECJ. A solution model is presented to ensure collective bargaining autonomy.