Targeted Killing

Objeotive To investigate the target killing effect off Raji cells with anti-CD20scFv-FcCD28/ζ gene chimeric T lymphocytes and the activation of T lymphocytes and further approach the mechanism of gene chimeric T lymphocytes target killing lymphoma cells.Methods The plasmids were transfected into retrovirus-packed PA317 cell lines by liposome.The supernatant wills collected from successfully transfected PA317 cells,then co-cultured with T lymphocytes,screening with G418 800μg/ml for 1 week.T-lymphocytes co-culture was grafted with Rail cell lines.the Bcl-2 of Raij cells were examined at timecourse by FACS.the level of IL-10 and IFN-γ was determined by ELISA.Results The Bcl-2 rate had obviously decreased within 24 h in Raii cells.the decreased amplitude was from 98.43%to 38.45%within 72 h.which is significant higher than that in control group and blank group.We found the IL-10 was 100.30 pg/ml in test group at 72 h,which was lower than that in control group(210.88 pg/ml)and blank group (286.71 pg/ml).At the same time IFN-γ(1487.23 pg/ml)was higher than that of other groups.Conclusion Anti-CD20-mediated T cells target lysis Rail cells does not require CD28 costimulation.T cells can enhanced inhibited the IL-10 secretion of Raji by CD28 and CD3ζ costimulation,and also decrease the Bcl-2 of Raji,thereby it accelerates the target cell lysis.CD28/ζ can completely activate T cell without exogenous B7/CD28 costimulation,which furthermore promote T lymphocyte secretion IFN-γ and can also enhance the targeted killing activity of T lymphocytes to Rail cells. Key words: Lymphoma; T lymphocyte; lmmunotherapy

The article offers a critique of the 2002 decision of the Israeli High Court of Justice that the Israeli policy of ‘targeted killings’, being a means of warfare against terrorism, is non‐justiciable. The critique, resting on the domestic, transnational and international ramifications of the decision, proposes that that decision is (i) inconsistent with the jurisprudence and practice of the court; (ii) inappropriate in terms of judicial policy; and (iii) ill‐advised in view of the nascent global (international and universal) criminal legal discourse, which encourages domestic courts to subject alleged crimes to their review. Such review gives domestic courts the opportunity to address both the international and the domestic communities, signalling to the former, that the domestic system participates in the global legal discourse, and to the latter, that normative behaviour may well advance the national interest.

The volume concludes with an exchange between the authors, directly engaging with the others’ respective argument. In this penultimate chapter, Meisels briefly responds and replies to the arguments raised by Waldron against targeted killing. Meisels emphasizes some points of agreement between the two authors: Their commitment to the right to life and the laws of armed conflicts, and their non-pacifist and non-absolutist position on targeted killing. She reemphasizes their points of disagreement, such as the authors’ very different use of analogies, particularly in determining the normative framework for discussing targeted killing (war/armed conflict), their differing views on possible proliferation of target killing, as well as disagreements over precedents and particular cases.

On 30 September 2011, the US citizen Anwar al-Awlaki was killed in Yemen in what has become the most controversial incident of US ‘targeted killing’, or, as its critics would prefer, of the US practice of ‘extrajudicial executions’. This controversy over wording expresses a profound disagreement over the legal status of the US drone program. Target killing suggests that the drone program may be legally regulated. Extrajudicial execution suggests that it falls outside the realm of legality. This article does not seek to settle which terminology is the most appropriate. Instead it analyses the legal expertise struggling to do so and its implications. More specifically, it focuses on the processes through which drones constitute the legal expertise that constitutes the drone program as one of targeted killings and of extrajudicial executions; that is, on a process of co-constitution. Drawing theoretical inspiration from and combining new materialist approaches (especially as articulated by Bruno Latour) with the sociological approach of Pierre Bourdieu, the article shows that drones have ‘agency’ in the ‘field’ of legal expertise pertaining to the drone program. Drones are redrawing the boundaries of legal expertise both by making associations to new forms of expertise and by generating technological expert roles. They are also renegotiating what is valuable to expertise. Drones are making both transparency and secrecy core to expertise. However, and contrary to what is often claimed, this agency does not inescapably lead to the normalization of targeted killings. The article therefore concludes that acknowledging the agency of drones is important for understanding how legal expertise is formed but especially for underscoring the continued potential for controversy and politics.

Civil-Military Issues in Targeted Killing by UAVs

Suicide bombings are the leading cause of death from terrorism in Israel. Counterterror tactics, such as the targeted killings or preemptive arrests of terror leaders or suspects, are meant to prev...

Targeted killings and assassinations are closely related, but not identical, phenomena; moreover, neither has a precise and accepted definition. While this article is principally concerned with targeted killings, it is useful to begin by briefly considering assassinations.

Targeted Killing

The threat of recurrence of violence remains a protracted concern in post-conflict contexts. This article contributes to the literature on post-conflict violence by analyzing a specific phenomenon that has characterized North Waziristan: the “Taliban target killing campaign” of civilians. The article argues that the targeted killings in (post-conflict) North Waziristan are a pre-mediated and calculated strategy employed by the militants to create space for their resurgence by silencing dissent through extortion, threats and killing of the locals. Exploring post-conflict violence, the article draws attention to the application of de-securitization in North Waziristan where “silent institutional” de-securitizations (i.e., state silence) are adopted to maintain the post-conflict fragile peace to prevent the risk of slippage into re-securitization. In explicating this, the article contributes by identifying three forms of silences: (i) silencing (by killing), (ii) state silence, and (iii) strategic silence. Doing so also helps to elaborate the function, meaning, and consequence of silence(s) in post-conflict contexts.

Gunneflo Book Symposium: Part 5: Targeted Killing and Spectacular War

Chapter III. Targeted killing

Targeted Killing

The attempt to propose a European perspective on targeted killings is problematic to the extent that implies an understanding thereof as an exclusively American practice. By doing so, it risks overlooking the intimate relation of drone warfare with a targeting regime that depends for its functioning upon a surveillant assemblage transcending the American/European distinction. This article understands “Europe” as a fundamental part in the US targeting killing programme. Rather than exceptional and episodic, indeed, the European participation in drone strikes represents a continuation of a practice of intelligence sharing that, originating as a Second World War UK–US agreement, nowadays encompasses an assemblage of countries that collect and share military intelligence with one another. This increasing ability to collect, circulate and analyse a vast amount of data has underwritten the emergence of a distinct “way of war” revolving around the tracking and killing of individuals worldwide. The category of “Europe”, the article concludes, is unable to make sense of these phenomena.

Targeted Killing

The use of unmanned aerial vehicles or “drones,” as part of the United States’ (US) targeted killing (TK) program dramatically increased after the War on Terror (WoT) was declared. With the ambiguous nature and parameters of the WoT, and stemming from the postulation of numerous low-level, niche-, and other securitizations producing a monolithic threat, US drone operations now constitute a vital stitch in the extensive fabric of US counterterrorism policy. This article employs the theories of securitization and macrosecuritization as discussed by Buzan (1991, 2006), and Buzan and Wæver (2009) to understand targeted killing, by means of weaponized drones, as an extraordinary measure according to the Copenhagen School’s interpretation. An overarching securitization and the use of the “security” label warrants the emergency action of targeted killing through the use of drones as an extraordinary measure. We argue that the WoT serves as a means of securitizing global terrorism as a threat significant enough to warrant the use of drone warfare as an extraordinary use of force. By accepting the WoT as a securitization process we can reasonably accept that the US’ response(s) against that threat are also securitized and therefore become extraordinary measures.