Target Centred Virtue Ethics and Role Ethics

Abstract

Abstract The development of ‘virtue jurisprudence’ (a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics for law) has highlighted the importance of virtue in legal ethics. Yet it has been criticized because it cannot account for “robust” role differentiation. In this chapter I argue that Target Centred Virtue Ethics can account for two features which constitute the ‘Role Dilemma’: (a) There is robust role differentiation; that is, role differentiation as conceived by the Standard Conception of law (and, e.g., business).(b) Occupiers of legal roles are not permitted to act immorally (except perhaps in “tragic” dilemmas).Virtue ethics and Standard Conceptions of law (and, e.g., business) are standardly thought to be incompatible. This may be true where virtue ethics is conceived in “orthodox” neo-Aristotelian terms. I reject this version of virtue ethics for role ethics and show that Target Centred Virtue Ethics can subscribe to both horns of the dilemma (a) and (b) above.