Taming the Tiger: Militarization and Democracy in Latin America

Abstract

The relationship between militarization and democracy in Latin America 1972-86 is evaluated. Two dimensions of democracy loosely based on Dahl's Polyarchy - average democracy over time and the lowest level of democracy during a multi-year period of time - are regressed against two indicators of militarization, military spending and military participation ratios. In pooled time-series analyses, it is shown that: (a) military spending has a significant negative effect on democracy scores over time; and (b) that military participation ratios have a more robust negative impact. In an alternative cross-sectional design and holding the lagged level of democracy constant, both militarization indicators are strongly related to low levels of democracy during a multi-year time period. When the two indicators are simultaneously utilized as regressors, military participation ratio remains robust and military spending becomes trivial. It is suggested that military participation ratios have a much stronger negative effect on democracy because (a) the data are more reliable for participation than expenditures, and (b) military participation ratio includes a pro-authoritarian socializing dimension. No evidence exists to support reversed causality: High militarization causes low levels of democracy, low levels of democracy do not cause militarization. Finally, it is shown that the negative impact of militarization on democracy began to diminish in the late 1970s, such that the negative effect is much stronger in 1973-74 than in 1985-86.