Talking and Thinking: The Role of Speech in Social Understanding

Abstract

: How talking and thinking or language and thought relate to one another has been discussed through generations in philosophy, linguistics and psychology. This is once again re-emerging as an important issue in social development with new evidence that language acquisition tends to be correlated with social cognitive development. The specific part played by language, and the function of social interaction more generally, have emerged as factors of central importance in current research on social cognitive development, or children's so-called theory of (Astington & Baird, 2005; Carpendale & Lewis, 2004, 2006; Symons, 2004). Here we review approaches to the relations between language and thought, and discuss our position on the role of language in social cognitive development. We should be clear, however, that the relations described between language and thought depend on one’s view of these phenomena. Even to discuss such links appears to presuppose that the two are separable and monolithic entities that can interact. From our perspective, language and thought are overall umbrella terms that include different aspects of human activity. Asking questions, making requests, persuading, apologizing and joking are diverse examples of what makes up language. Similarly, although thought may include imagining the smell of roses, remembering to buy a bouquet for one’s spouse and then calculating the cost, or attempting to figure out why a particular rose bush is not doing well in one’s garden, these diverse activities seem to have little in common. We view language as activity, and when we consider talking and thinking in relation to the other terms we require in this chapter—social understanding, social interaction and mind—any sharp lines between them begin to blur, especially when we consider developmental relations. That is, early forms of interaction in which infants’ attention is coordinated with others’, referred to as joint attention, are the foundation on which the later use of words is based. These forms of interaction represent what is essential about language and yet they can also be considered social skills. In turn, they allow for further development of language and social understanding (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). The background to this chapter is our position that the view of the mind assumed in the “theory of mind” tradition according to which “mental states” such as beliefs, desires and intentions underlie and cause outer physical behaviour is deeply problematic for a number of reasons. Given this view of the mind the question raised in the “theory of mind” tradition is how do children come to understand their own and others’ minds? Several types of solutions have been proposed. The dominant account is that children must infer what is going on in others’ minds and form and test theories about how the mind works. An alternative suggestion is that such ways of thinking about social matters may have evolved phylogenetically rather than developing in an individual ontogenetic manner. Alternatively, children may introspect on their own minds and reason by analogy about others’ minds. These positions appear mutually exclusive, but various combinations of weaker versions have been proposed. However, in spite of their apparent differences there are a number of similarities. They all assume that social understanding is based on a core cognitive strategy, whereas we