Abstract

Proposals for regulating or nudging healthy choices are controversial. Opponents often argue that individuals should take responsibility for their own health, rather than be paternalistically manipulated for their own good. In this paper, I argue that people can take responsibility for their own health only if they satisfy certain epistemic conditions, but we live in an epistemic environment in which these conditions are not satisfied. Satisfying the epistemic conditions for taking responsibility, I argue, requires regulation of this environment. I describe some proposals for such regulation and show that we cannot reject all regulation in the name of individual responsibility. We must either regulate individuals’ healthy choices or regulate the epistemic environment.

Highlights

  • Opposition to intervention and the epistemic conditionOpposition to the regulation of health-related choices has long come from those with a libertarian or pro-market bent

  • Lifestyle-related factors are responsible for a huge burden of disease [1]

  • I argue that insofar as those on the anti-intervention side accept that individuals should take responsibility for their own healthy choices, they are committed to much more intervention than many of them would care to approve

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Summary

Opposition to intervention and the epistemic condition

Opposition to the regulation of health-related choices has long come from those with a libertarian or pro-market bent. For the purposes of my argument here: autonomous agents must satisfy the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is a condition of both moral responsibility and autonomy that agents be appropriately informed concerning the nature and likely consequences of their actions. By assuming the less demanding account, I make my task harder and avoid begging questions against my opponents Do agents satisfy these relatively undemanding conditions with regard to their health-relevant choices? Philosophers who have identified these markers of expertise differ among themselves as to whether it is reasonable to expect ordinary people to be able to deploy them in order to identify genuine experts—thereby satisfying the conditions on epistemic responsibility. On very many questions—including, but not limited to, questions concerning healthy behaviors—the epistemic environment is polluted, and the extent of this pollution is sufficient to ensure that one cannot reasonably expect ordinary people to distinguish trustworthy sources from untrustworthy ones

Epistemic pollution
Identifying experts in a polluted environment
Restoring trust in science
Findings
Compliance with ethical standards

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