Taiping Island's Hypothetical EEZ: Policy Options and Their Impacts on Taiwan's Key Interests

Abstract

Itu Aba (Taiping) Island was first occupied sixty years ago by the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). It is the largest feature in the Spratly Islands, has been continuously occupied for the longest period of time, and is the only one with a naturally occurring fresh water source. It also has a native population of flora and fauna, basic infrastructure, and agriculture for food production. However, in the international arbitral proceedings unilaterally initiated by the Philippines against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2013, the Philippines and its legal team have pushed for the Arbitral Tribunal to issue an award ruling that Itu Aba (Taiping) Island is not an island but a rock under Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Prevented from formally participating in the arbitration case, Taipei has used other means to demonstrate with all certainty that Itu Aba (Taiping) Island meets or exceeds the basic qualifications of an island under international law. Given the evidence, it is a distinct possibility that the Arbitral Tribunal will determine in its upcoming award that the feature constitutes an island and that it therefore may be entitled to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In the event of such a decision, the ROC will be presented with three broad policy options, including (1) maintaining ambiguity about the territorial claims derived from its 1947 map, (2) clarifying its territorial claims in a way that contradicts contemporary interpretations of international law, and (3) clarifying its territorial claims to be in accordance with international law, UNCLOS, and the Arbitral Tribunal’s award. This article assesses the positive and negative impacts that these three policy options could have on the ROC’s key interests, which are categorized as (1) national security, (2) territorial sovereignty claims, (3) its role as a responsible stakeholder and regional peacemaker, (4) domestic politics, (5) cross-strait relations, (6) relations with other claimants, (7) relations with the US, (8) regional stability, and (9) its diplomatic status in international fora. It then concludes that the first policy option is optimal in the short term until the award is announced and that, if Itu Aba (Taiping) Island is determined to qualify as an island under UNCLOS, the benefits of the third option will outweigh the costs. That said, ROC officials and relevant experts will have to take several key issues into account for the policy shift to produce the full range of potential benefits for Taiwan, rival claimants, and major stakeholders in the South China Sea.