Abstract
The development and design of financial incentive schemes as a sustainable and cost-effective intervention strategy to foster effectiveness of medical interventions remains a significant challenge in health care delivery.Based on the findings of the conceptual model of medical non-persistence we test three different financial incentive schemes. These incentives are derived upon concepts of behavioral economics, in particular mental accounting, prospect theory and choice bracketing, and incorporated into deposit, copayment and bonus schemes. We conduct randomized laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of each incentive scheme on persistence behavior under controlled conditions. Participants in the experiment are students remunerated according to their performance in the experiment.We find that financial incentive schemes based on the principles of prospect theory significantly improve treatment persistence compared to the situation where there are no incentives at all. This finding implies that the simple but smart re-allocation of co-payments and co-payment support between the treatment initiation phase and treatment maintenance phase represents an effective way of promoting persistence behavior.This study delivers first applications of behavioral interventions based on theoretical foundation. Using the method of experimental economics the study serves as a first proof of concept of a scalable way to design, calibrate and test the effectiveness of financial incentives on behavioral change. This approach is inevitable for broad application in real world as it minimizes the need for patient research while clarifying the impact of interventions under controlled conditions before these interventions get implemented in the field.
Highlights
The development and design of financial incentive schemes as a sustainable and cost-effective intervention strategy to foster effectiveness of medical interventions remains a significant challenge in health care delivery
The aim of the study is to design 1) financial incentive schemes build on principles of behavioral economics to better describe and address patient decision-making biases in health contexts and to use 2) behavioural laboratory experiments as a scalable way to evaluate the performance of the financial schemes
The current study uses the procedure of behavioral economic engineering to develop and test three different financial incentive schemes aimed at improving persistence behavior
Summary
The development and design of financial incentive schemes as a sustainable and cost-effective intervention strategy to foster effectiveness of medical interventions remains a significant challenge in health care delivery. Based on the findings of the conceptual model of medical non-persistence we test three different financial incentive schemes These incentives are derived upon concepts of behavioral economics, in particular mental accounting, prospect theory and choice bracketing, and incorporated into deposit, copayment and bonus schemes. Using the method of experimental economics the study serves as a first proof of concept of a scalable way to design, calibrate and test the effectiveness of financial incentives on behavioral change. This approach is inevitable for broad application in real world as it minimizes the need for patient research while clarifying the impact of interventions under controlled conditions before these interventions get implemented in the field. More and more emphasis is on gathering evidence to identify the interventions that are most effective at improving health outcomes, and realigning the behaviors of all stakeholders - patients, providers, manufacturers and others - around these interventions
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
