Tactics, strategy and space

Abstract

In this chapter I will examine some of the practical steps that were taken to promote and consolidate the British and Irish governments’ shared objective of inclusiveness in the Northern Ireland political/peace process. I will do so from the perspective of someone who was personally involved in many of the more obscure aspects of the search to find a viable accommodation. At the beginning of that phase, 1990–2, persuading the ‘constitutional’ parties to engage with each other and the two governments was paramount. That persuasion included dialogue between ministers, officials and members of those parties, particularly the unionist parties, ranging from grass-roots supporters, party officers and district councillors to MPs and other senior figures. It also involved dialogue with non-political ‘opinion formers’, such as church, business and trades union leaders, and community activists. There was no general understanding that ultimately a comprehensive, durable settlement would be achieved only with the participation of the political representatives of militant republicanism – (principally Sinn Fein) – and militant loyalism – principally the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) – but as events unfolded that would change. I will look at how the consequences of the changed circumstances were addressed so that following paramilitary ceasefires those groups were able to join the process as equal partners, before considering how dialogue with associates of the residual (and small but dangerous) republican and loyalist paramilitary groups that had not been present at the talks was established and maintained after the Belfast Agreement in 1998 and consequent devolution. And how the representatives of the PUP and the UDP, who had garnered little electoral advantage in the resultant elections, were encouraged to develop mechanisms and strategies that would allow them to put their creativity and energy at the disposal of their communities.