Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress

Abstract

Omnibus legislating is a standard part of the congressional landscape altering traditional lawmaking in important ways. Yet we know little about it. Omnibus bills are almost always enacted into law. An important question, therefore, is, Why do leaders attach some bills to these measures and not others? I examine this question by developing and testing three sets of plausible explanations of omnibus packaging (one based on the leader-member relationship, a second based on the Congresspresident relationship, and a third based on environmental factors). I present an original definition of omnibus legislation and analyze the omnibus attachment process from 1979 to 1994. I find that leaders, members, and the president all accrue benefits from omnibus legislation. Consistent with the arguments of legislative scholars and political observers, a tough budgetary situation and divided government increase the likelihood of omnibus usage. Issue fragmentation within the committee system, however, provides the strongest contextual impact. C ongressional leaders employ a number of tactics to assemble legislative coalitions in the face of legislators' multidimensional preferences. Three key tactics utilized are (1) the ordering of alternatives in committee and on the floor (e.g., Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Denzau and Mackay 1983; Romer and Rosenthal 1978; McKelvey 1976); (2) the use of closed rules in the House limiting the acceptance of amendments once the legislation leaves the committee (e.g., Bach and Smith 1988; Binder 1997; Dion 1997; Fiorina 1987); and (3) the unification of diverse measures within a single large bill, or omnibus legislating. Much legislative research addresses the ordering of alternatives and the use of the closed rule. In contrast, the omnibus tactic is less intensely scrutinized. Several scholars conclude that an important recent change in the legislative process is the move to omnibus legislating (Baumgartner et al. 1997; Mayhew 1991; Oleszek 1996; Sinclair 1995, 1997; Smith 1989).1 This institutional change is important for two main reasons. First, when leaders utilize the omnibus tactic, they alter the time-honored legislative process. Omnibus packages are often fast-tracked through committees with less consideration than typical bills. Once assembled by leaders, omnibus packages are treated as one piece of legislation, seriously restricting the choices available to members on the floor. Members must take-it-or-leave-it and are seldom aware of the details contained in omnibus bills (Sinclair 1997; Smith 1989). Second, omnibus packages present a viable alternative legislative route for policy entrepreneurs pushing legislation. Legislative leaders behave strategically and attempt to assemble omnibus bills that will succeed. Evidence suggests that they are successful; over 98 percent of the omnibus bills identified in this study were enacted. Hence, omnibus attachments almost al-