Tackling China's local environmental policy implementation gap: An evolutionary game analysis of China's environmental protection inspection system

Abstract

Despite China's stringent environmental regulations, there has been a persistent policy implementation gap at local level, specifically due to local protectionism and inadequate enforcement measures. To address this issue, the Central Environmental Protection Inspection (CEPI) initiative was launched in 2016, replacing the Regional Environmental Protection Inspection (REPI) system. This study examines why the REPI failed to tackle the implementation gap and how the CEPI works. This is achieved by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game (EG) model consisting of the central government, local governments, and polluting enterprises. Using system dynamics (SD), the study simulates and analyzes the behavior and strategies of the three game players in two scenarios, namely weak and strong negative incentives. Then, this study analyzes the evolutionary process of environmental protection inspection (EPI) by means of a case study. The results show that: (1) the strategy adopted by polluting enterprises depends on the actual signal conveyed by the local governments. In addition, whether the strong regulatory signal of the central government can be effectively transmitted to polluting enterprises mainly depends on the attitude of the local governments. (2) The CEPI conveys a reliable commitment and provides effective external stimuli that adjust the incentive structure of local governments. Meanwhile, the REPI lacked significant punishment measures, which made it difficult for the central government's environmental regulatory signals to reach polluting enterprises in an effective manner. This study contributes to a better understanding of the evolutionary process and causes of the EPI system, as well as how the Chinese government tackles the local environmental policy implementation gap.