Abstract

Alongside with ethics and religion, art occupies a prominent place in Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life. His opposition to Husserl and Heidegger, and his analyses of Wassily Kandinsky’s paintings and theoretical works, led Henry to the conclusion that the content of art is the ‘invisible life’. As a consequence, art – itself invisible though at the same time revealing the Life – becomes a means of achieving a non-intentional experience (pathos) of Life in its transcendental affectivity. The radical immanence of experiencing art stands in sharp contrast to the visible external world, thus opening new directions in phenomenological study of both aesthetic and religious experience. In this article, I point out the ontological, epistemological and axiological limitations of Henry’s and Kandinsky’s art theory.

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