Abstract

This paper explores the influence of scale effects and corruption on forest harvesting. Policy-maker and bureaucratic corruption are considered sequentially. Overall, the corrupt policy maker chooses a less stringent forest policy. Moreover, this permissive forest policy partly enhances bureaucratic corruption. This paper therefore partially supports the idea of systemic corruption. Finally, it appears that a larger number of lobbying firms tends to increase this effect.

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