Systemic corruption and institutional multiplicity: Brazilian examples of a complex relationship

Abstract

Systemic corruption is usually described as a stable self-reinforcing equilibrium that traps individuals by reducing incentives to behave honestly. This article assumes that law enforcement institutions may also be trapped in this equilibrium, leaving no alternative to individuals who want to report corruption. Would the existence of multiple institutions performing accountability functions – what we call institutional multiplicity – reduce the probability that all institutions would be trapped in a systemic corruption environment? We start by hypothesizing that even in contexts of systemic corruption there may be ‘pockets of honesty.’ If this is the case, institutional multiplicity, by increasing the number of accountability institutions available, may create avenues for individuals to report corruption. On the other hand, multiplicity may also increase the risk of ‘façade enforcement’ – that is, the mere appearance of accountability that reinforces a systemic corruption equilibrium. We illustrate these two scenarios with Brazilian examples. We end the article with a discussion of the design of accountability systems in contexts of systemic corruption, arguing that there may be advantages in preserving institutional multiplicity if its deleterious effects are addressed. While based on the Brazilian experience, this article advances theoretical hypotheses that may be useful to other countries.