Synchronization of the Ukrainian criminal legislation with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Abstract

The article is devoted to clarifying the compliance of the current legislation of Ukraine with the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The author evaluates the norms of the Constitution of Ukraine from the perspective of the Charter, and then analyzes the completeness of their reflection in the provisions of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Special attention is paid to human dignity as a priority right recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
 The author agrees with researchers who recognize that the new "philosophy of human rights" is implemented in the Charter, which receives a normative embodiment in the founding documents of the European Union, and supports the proposal to make appropriate changes to the text of the current Constitution of Ukraine.
 The existing incompleteness of the criminal law protection of such a fundamental right as human dignity in Ukrainian legislation has been confirmed.
 Attention is drawn to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights regarding value judgments that cannot be proven in court. It is argued that in such a situation, a person who defends his dignity has the right to express his opinion, assess what happened, with further consideration by the court of the issue of restoring the violated human right in a certain form. And in the presence of evaluative judgments, a person does not lose the right to compensation for damage caused by such judgments. The content, form, direction of such evaluative judgments, their impact on the addressee (the person it concerns), their publicity, etc., are important for the court to make a fair decision.
 The author's suggestions regarding the further improvement of the criminal legislation of Ukraine with the aim of its proper synchronization with the legislation of the European Union are presented. Added additional argumentation regarding the need to criminalize slander and insults with clarification of the expediency of recognizing the relevant components of criminal offenses as material with a consequence in the form of compound damage (moral and material).