Abstract

To enable today’s industrial automation, a significant number of sensors and actuators are required. In order to obtain trust and isolate faults in the data collected by this network, protection against authenticity fraud and nonrepudiation is essential. In this paper, we propose a very efficient symmetric-key-based security mechanism to establish authentication and nonrepudiation among all the nodes including the gateway in a distributed cooperative network, without communicating additional security parameters to establish different types of session keys. The solution also offers confidentiality and anonymity in case there are no malicious nodes. If at most one of the nodes is compromised, authentication and nonrepudiation still remain valid. Even if more nodes get compromised, the impact is limited. Therefore, the proposed method drastically differs from the classical group key management schemes, where one compromised node completely breaks the system. The proposed method is mainly based on a hash chain with multiple outputs defined at the gateway and shared with the other nodes in the network.

Highlights

  • Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networks (WSANs) are currently very popular and are nowadays applied in a multitude of domains for monitoring and control

  • WSANs consist of a group of sensors, measuring different types of environmental parameters such as temperature, sound, humidity, and motion together with actuators equipped with, e.g., servos and motors that interact with them

  • There exists a wide variety of solutions addressing key management in wireless sensor networks for different types of keys for different types of network topologies

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Summary

Introduction

Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networks (WSANs) are currently very popular and are nowadays applied in a multitude of domains for monitoring and control. A very popular and elegant symmetric-key-based broadcast authentication mechanism for WSANs, called TESLA [1], was developed in 2002 This protocol only allows authentication by the root, known as sink or cluster head, to the other nodes of the network. An effective symmetric-key-based mechanism, which addresses authenticity, coming from the different nodes of a distributed network (without predefined positions) has not yet been proposed in literature as far as the authors are aware. This shortcoming has been circumvented till by the use of a common group key shared among all nodes in the network. As soon as one of the nodes is captured and corrupted, the whole security of the network is broken

Related Work
Network Model
Attacker Model
Security Features
Cryptographic Operations
Key Initialization
Broadcast Message of Gateway
Reaction of Nodes
Security Evaluation
Computational Cost
Communication Cost j
Storage Cost
Conclusions and Future Work
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