Abstract
Cache timing attacks allow third-party observers to retrieve sensitive information from program executions. But, is it possible to automatically check the vulnerability of a program against cache timing attacks and then, automatically shield program executions against these attacks? For a given program, a cache configuration and an attack model, our CacheFix framework either verifies the cache side-channel freedom of the program or synthesizes a series of patches to ensure cache side-channel freedom during program execution. At the core of our framework is a novel symbolic verification technique based on automated abstraction refinement of cache semantics. The power of such a framework allows symbolic reasoning over counterexample traces and combines it with runtime monitoring for eliminating cache side channels during program execution. Our evaluation with routines from OpenSSL , libfixedtimefixedpoint , GDK , and FourQlib libraries reveals that our CacheFix approach (dis)proves cache side-channel freedom within an average of 75 s. In nearly all test cases, CacheFix synthesizes all patches within 20 min to ensure cache side-channel freedom of the respective routines during execution.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
