Symbolic Model Checking of Security Protocols for Ad hoc Networks on any Topologies

Abstract

Petri nets have proved their effectiveness in modeling and formal verification of a large number of applications: control systems, communication protocols, application workflows, hardware design, etc. In the present days, one important focus of computer science is on security and secure communications. The use of Petri nets for verifying security properties is not a mature field due to a lack of convenient modeling and verification capabilities. So far, in the Petri Net field there is only CPN Tools that is mature enough for modeling, using the colored Petri nets formalism. Nevertheless such verifications cannot be performed on large systems as CPN Tools is based on an exhaustive way of computing the semantics of a model. In this paper we present the use of AlPiNA, another candidate for this task. AlPiNA is a symbolic model checker that uses the formalism of algebraic Petri nets. We have used it successfully for modeling ad hoc networks and for verifying security protocols designed for this type of networks. As a case study and benchmark we have chosen the ARAN secure routing protocol. We managed to find all the attacks that were already reported for this protocol. To our knowledge this work is also the first successful attempt to use Petri nets for model checking the security properties of ad hoc networks protocols.