Abstract
Our paper focuses on how firms strategically respond to environmental regulations on environmental actions. Given the greater discretion in environmental information disclosure and relaxed environmental regulations enforcement in China, we propose that firms tend to say more while do less to obtain environmental legitimacy, namely corporate environmental actions decoupling. Using a sample of 5422 Chinese firm-year observations over the period of 2012–2018, we document that stringent environmental regulations contribute to a significant inconsistency between environmental reporting and actual environmental performance. Moreover, we demonstrate that this inconsistency is exacerbated when firms possess greater bargaining power and fewer financial resources. Our paper not only advances the understanding of how firms navigate external regulations by examining the tradeoffs between symbolic and substantive actions, but also sheds light on factors influencing decoupling/greenwashing practices from the perspective of government-business relations in China, and potentially in other emerging economies.
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