Abstract
Our moral motivations might include a drive towards maximizing overall welfare, consistent with an ethical theory called “utilitarianism.” However, people show non-utilitarian judgments in domains as diverse as healthcare decisions, income distributions, and penal laws. Rather than these being deviations from a fundamentally utilitarian psychology, we suggest that our moral judgments are generally non-utilitarian, even for cases that are typically seen as prototypically utilitarian. We show two separate deviations from utilitarianism in such cases: people do not think maximizing welfare is required (they think it is merely acceptable, in some circumstances), and people do not think that equal welfare tradeoffs are even acceptable. We end by discussing how utilitarian reasoning might play a restricted role within a non-utilitarian moral psychology.
Highlights
Many moral decisions seem aimed at maximizing overall welfare, consistent with an ethical theory called “utilitarianism.” A classic example from moral philosophy involves a runaway trolley that can be switched from a track where it will kill five people to an alternative track where it will kill only one person [1,2]
We argue that even the case often taken as most prototypical of utilitarian reasoning shows two deviations from utilitarianism, suggesting that such moral judgments are not based on utilitarianism (e.g.,[45])
We found that the majority of participants judge switching a runaway trolley from a set of tracks with 5 people to a set of tracks with 1 person to be “acceptable” but not “required.” This result is inconsistent with the demands of utilitarianism, and instead are consistent with Rozyman and colleagues [36], who found for a variety of other cases that a substantial percentage of participants will judge a utility-maximizing behavior as “permissible” but not “required.”
Summary
Many moral decisions seem aimed at maximizing overall welfare (i.e., minimizing harms and maximizing benefits), consistent with an ethical theory called “utilitarianism.” A classic example from moral philosophy involves a runaway trolley that can be switched from a track where it will kill five people to an alternative track where it will kill only one person [1,2]. This case, and many variations on it, have been the focus of much recent work in moral psychology, with the majority of people judging that it is morally acceptable to maximize overall welfare, switching the trolley to the track with only one person (e.g., [3,4,5,6,7]). Comparative research with nonhuman animals has revealed that prosocial motivations can be PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0160084 August 9, 2016
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
