“Sweet Malefactor”: The Social Costs of Slavery and Sugar in Jamaica and Cuba, 1807–541

Abstract

T tHE purpose of this article is to examine conceptual and methodological problems that apply to cost of commodities produced by a slaveplantation economy which has a net annual decrease in its labour force. Two slave-plantation economies-Jamaica and Cuba-will be compared to show cost advantage accruing to Cuban sugar-planters whose access to African slaves was denied to theirJamaican counterparts. Comparative cost data from British Board of Trade report of I 830 will be presented and evaluated. Moreover, social costs of slavery and sugar will be investigated in context of debates on sugar duties, and of closing of slave trade. Recent work on economics of slavery in Southern states of America has shattered old myths and gone far to restore old realities. By adopting modern capital theory whereby lifetime net earnings of a slave are discounted and compared with his or her market value, it has been possible to compute rate of return on capital invested in a slave and compare this rate with that earned on other investments. To surprise of an older generation of historians, it has been shown that slaves were profitable investments. Indeed, Profs. Fogel and Engerman assert that the large slave plantation had achieved, on average, a degree of efficiency that was unmatched by any other major subsector of American agriculture, North or South, during antebellum era. 2 But favourable rate of return that accrued to Southern slave-holders was a function of a demographic situation that has seldom obtained in other slave societies. Slave-holders realized capital gains because slave population increased annually by natural means, and they realised other benefits which stemmed from stable family units and long working life expectancy. Even without capital gains rate of return was high. By contrast, slave population of Caribbean sugar colonies experienced a net annual decrease which was offset by import of blacks from Africa. Caribbean slave-holders generally found it cheaper to buy new slaves in a ratio of about two males to every female and replace them by frequent purchases, than to balance sexes and encourage family life and reproduction. Poor demographic performance did not necessarily