Sweden's Postwar Diplomacy: Some Problems, Views, and Issues

Abstract

HE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY is so firmly planted in Swedish national consciousness that no Swedish Government could long remain in power which does not unconditionally subscribe to the doctrine that neutrality is the best policy for Sweden. Indeed, a Swedish Government that would oppose this doctrine would be unthinkable. Government and people, regardless of politics, seem to have a secret understanding, or gentlemen's agreement, that anything but strict adherence to this Weltanschauung would be intolerable; and seem to have signed a secret pact to stop anybody with a different concept from getting into a position where he might change the course that was chartered almost 150 years ago by the first Bernadotte king. There is so little difference between the Swedes with regard to this fundamental basis for their foreign policy that strangers talking to them get the impression that they have been briefed by their Foreign Office what to tell visitors from other countries. This does not mean, however, that there are no nuances in the policy of neutrality. It is not an inflexible strategy; it allows for tactical modifications, depending on time and circumstance. During World War II, the policy bent one way to adjust to the pressures from Germany in the beginning of the war, and bent in another direction later on to accommodate the demands from the Western Powers. Sweden emerged unscathed from the war, and gave its policy of neutrality almost the entire credit for it.