Swaying citizen support for EU membership: Evidence from a survey experiment of German voters

Nikoleta Yordanova,Mariyana Angelova,Moritz Osnabrügge,Roni Lehrer,Sander Renes

doi:10.1177/1465116520923735

Abstract

The United Kingdom’s 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum vote to leave the European Union (EU) raised concerns that other countries would follow suit. This article examines how arguments about EU membership related to economic, cultural, political, and security and peace issues could influence how citizens would vote in EU membership referendums. Our two-wave survey experiment on a random sample of the German population and difference-in-differences analysis revealed that only fears of being outvoted in EU decision-making swayed German voters’ attitudes about EU membership, particularly voters with weaker EU support, little EU knowledge and low levels of political engagement. We therefore conclude that concerns about sovereignty loss can be drivers of Euroscepticism even in a country that has vast influence over EU decisions.

Highlights

The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) ‘Brexit’ referendum of 23 June 2016 was the first time an electoral majority voted to leave the European Union (EU)
It is important to understand what types of arguments in EU exit discussions can sway voters’ opinions about EU membership and which voters are most susceptible to specific arguments in the remaining member states
Building on Goodwin et al (2020), we expect that negative arguments about the economic, cultural, political, and peace and security aspects of European integration should have a greater potential to sway public opinion on EU membership in Germany since they have been less common in the discussion

Summary

Introduction

The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) ‘Brexit’ referendum of 23 June 2016 was the first time an electoral majority voted to leave the European Union (EU). Building on Goodwin et al (2020), we expect that negative arguments about the economic, cultural, political, and peace and security aspects of European integration should have a greater potential to sway public opinion on EU membership in Germany since they have been less common in the discussion. Hypothesis 1b predicts that exposure to less familiar negative arguments about the EU (related to negative political or peace/security aspects of European integration) will have a stronger effect on EU exit attitudes than more familiar negative arguments (related to negative economic or cultural aspects). These events drew public attention to the security challenges within the EU, which are complicated by the Schengen policy of open borders between member states (The Economist, 2015) Those who were exposed to the argument that Germany can be outvoted at the EU level and other states’ interests can be imposed on Germany significantly lowered their support for remaining in the EU compared to the control group. The share of remainers in the control group increased from

77.5 July 2016

Findings

Discussion