Abstract
Economies with adverse selection are studied as matching problems. Feasible stationary matching plans are defined by market-clearing equations and informational incentive constraints. When the matching market is contestable, alternative matching systems are characterized by viable prospectus mappings. A feasible plan is sustainable if it can, with a suitably constructed waiting list, inhibit defections to all alternative matching systems. Competitively sustainable plans, which do not require centralized management of the waiting list, are shown to always exist, although they may be Pareto-dominated by other sustainable plans. Representatively sustainable plans are also defined, and are shown to always exist and be Pareto-efficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D82.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
