Abstract
A large population of agents play a public goods game. Agents’ subjective payoff differs according to their level of altruism. More altruistic agents generate greater positive externality in Nash equilibrium. The strength of institutions determines the extent to which agents can materially benefit from the positive externalities they generate. Therefore, stronger institutions confer evolutionary advantage on more altruistic preferences, enabling such preferences to survive and proliferate.
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