Abstract
We examine strategic certiorari voting among the justices of the Vinson Court, i.e., the extent to which justices consider the relative likelihood of winning on the merits when deciding to grant or deny review. We find strong evidence that justices who wish to affirm carefully consider probable outcomes, but find no evidence that justices who wish to reverse do so. In Perry's (1991) terms, we find that the justices engage in aggressive grants but do not engage in defensive denials.
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