Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings and Constitutional Change. By Paul M. CollinsJr. and Lori A. Ringhand New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 296 pp. $32.99 paperback.

Abstract

Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings and Constitutional Change. By Paul M. Collins, Jr., and Lori A. Ringhand. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 296 pp. $32.99 paperback.This book does exactly what scholarly manuscript ought to do: It offers novel theoretical interpretation of long-known phenomenon, makes arguments backed up with empirical evidence and accompanied by real-life examples, and makes one think. While it remains debatable whether theirs is right view of phenomenon under study, it is absolutely case that it ought to be taken seriously and widely discussed and debated. Indeed, I urge everyone with an interest in confirmation hearings and in interplay between Congress, Supreme Court, and public, to engage with their analysis and discuss its implications. After summarizing their argument, I will do so here, in hopes of beginning conversation.In their book, Collins and Ringhand analyze Supreme Court confirmation hearings, attributing to them more meaning than has been so attributed to date. The conventional wisdom is basically that Senators are grandstanding and playing to their constituents as they ask long-winded statement/questions while nominees themselves decline to answer most basic of questions concerning their views on relevant issues. We already know, from other scholarly research, that latter is not true; Justice-Nominees do indeed answer most of questions posed to them. In addition, although, Collins and Ringhand ascribe much more meaning to questioning arguing that these hearings constitute a democratic forum for discussion and ratification of constitutional change (p. 10). They make case for their much-more-charitable interpretation of these events by showing that Senators ask questions about issues that are important to public, and that conversations they have with nominees are grounded in Supreme Court precedent. This translates, they argue, into evidence that, through process, Senate informs public of Supreme Court precedent, takes position informed by public opinion on constitutional interpretation choices made in those precedents, and communicates to Supreme Court nominees expectation that they will abide by those preferred, public-opinion-ratified constitutional understandings. They test these claims via two empirical chapters and several qualitative analyses, finding support for their view.Their characterization of hearings as democratic forum for constitutional discussion is intriguing. Indeed, many legal scholars argue that judges ought not be exclusively charged with interpreting so construal of confirmation hearings that considers people's constitution, as many scholars call it, is attractive. Is it possible that these hearings are official way in which the people contribute to constitutional conversation? Perhaps, although I have few doubts making me resist Collins and Ringhand's notion.Most importantly, I continue to struggle with considering questions asked by Senators to constitute constitutional conversation, expecting instead that they are either way for Senators to wax eloquent on issues important to their voters, or way for Senators to predict how nominee will vote. The findings reported in book remain consistent with both notions: Senators ask about policies, not about theories of constitutional interpretation; and largest impact on questioning is amount of legislation in particular issue area and not most important issue or amount of Supreme Court precedent in an issue area (although they each matter as well). …