Abstract

In times where European doctrines of Direct Effect and Supremacy were well known, the former Andean Pact underwent a significant institutional reform to become the new founded Andean Community, adopting changes that came from Europe in the shape of polity design. Supranationality was reinforced, and community organs were established with striking resemblance to their European counterparts, especially the Court of Justice of the Andean Community with its procedure of preliminary rulings. It was thought to become an Engine of Integration.Nevertheless, regional integration outcome has been poor. In the 27 years of existence of the Andean Court, the Community has not been able to establish its customs union, which has been subsequently postponed by intergovernmental decisions, and only in 1995 an imperfect customs union could be announced. The salient divergence shown by both integration outcomes poses the puzzle we shall try to solve with a neofunctionalist approach. Given the matching polity-designs and the judicial cross-fertilization between both regions: why did the ACJ fail to become the engine of Andean integration like the ECJ did? The investigation focuses on supranational adjudication as a possible variable that may have had an influence on the disappointing performance of the integration scheme.

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