Support for redistribution is shaped by motives of egalitarian division and coercive redistribution

Abstract

The three-player evolutionary model of support for redistribution is compatible with a fairness motive; however, existing research has found near-zero effects of fairness. Here we propose an egalitarian division fairness motive, solving the problem of reward for collaboration and impacting support for redistribution. Study 1 (N = 403) showed egalitarian division fairness had additional predictive power predicting support for redistribution (β = 0.14), as well as discriminant validity from self-interest, compassion, and envy. Robustness was supported by a replication (N = 402), yielding a significant and larger effect size (β = 0.25) of egalitarian division with support for redistribution. We also examined support for coercive redistribution. In both studies, willingness to use coercive redistribution was predicted by egalitarian division fairness (S1 β = 0.15, S2: β = 0.31) and, independently, by instrumental harm (S1 β = 0.21, S2: β = 0.16). These motives expand the three-player model to include fairness and coercive enforcement, and suggest applications of evolution in developing better political, economic, and ethical knowledge. Evolved motives accounted for ~45 % of support for redistribution.