Abstract
As gambling becomes increasingly accessible both in the U.S. and worldwide, governments face an important policy question: how should they exploit the industry’s growth to raise tax revenues while protecting individuals from the detrimental effects of gambling? Using data on slot machines from the largest per-capita gambling market in the world, Australia, we estimate a structural oligopoly model to: (1) quantify firms’ incentives to make gambling accessible among socio-economically disadvantaged groups; and (2) evaluate the effect of government policy (gambling taxes, supply caps and venue smoking bans) on the distribution of slot machine supply, tax revenue and problem gambling prevalence. Classification-H71, L13, L83, L88, I31
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
