Supply side incentive under the Renewable Portfolio Standards: A perspective of China

Abstract

Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) is a mandatory institutional change to promote low-carbon energy transformation and renewable energy development. Its successful implementation requires the scientific design of relevant incentive mechanisms and rules. To make up for the defects in the current RPS mechanism design and the problems exposed in the Tradable Green Certificate (TGC) market, this paper takes China as an example and uses the system dynamics method to study the supply side incentives. The results show that: (1) Scientific setting the relevant system parameters of RPS (such as quota, benchmark price and penalty) and promoting the electricity market reform will effectively stimulate the power generation and investment on the supply side, and improve manufacturers' profit. (2) Higher quotas and lower benchmark prices can increase the manufacturers' power generation, profit and investment, and stimulate the supply side to conduct TGC transactions. However, when the penalty is set at different multiples of the benchmark price, the incentive effect on supply side power generation, investment and profit differ. (3) Marketed on-grid prices can significantly stimulate the supply side and promote renewable energy development. This paper can provide reference for the design of RPS incentive mechanism and institutional parameters.