Supply chain management in times of crisis: a multi-case study

Abstract

Relying on an inductive multi-case logic, this study analyses public discourse involving four supply chain crises in Europe: (i) NotPetya Cyberattack on A.P. Møller-Maersk of 2017, (ii) the Evonik industrial accident of 2012, (iii) Cadbury’s Salmonella Scare of 2006 and (iv) Horsemeat Scandal of 2013. Grounded on contingency theory, the research finds three main operational vulnerabilities (an MSN of threats) surrounding the investigated cases: Market pressures, Sector dependencies and Network liabilities. The study also identifies four themes of crisis mitigation (4IR measures): (i) intelligence review for reassessments, (ii) integrated relationships for response, (iii) innovation resilience for recovery and (iv) integrity rebuilding for reassurance. Driving these mitigation measures is a customer-first mindset and close customer discussions that strive to restore normalcy, recover operations, and regulate networks. This research is original in its focus on a ‘supply chain crisis’ paradigm and adds to discourse on competitive and/or restorative capabilities for supply chain management (SCM) in times of crisis. Theoretically, the research advances a ‘coactive’ SCM strategy for improved SCM performance in times of crisis, and managerially, the value of the research lies in insights on ‘best practice’ for supply chain crisis management and decisiveness for confront and contain supply chain crises.