Abstract

Due to excessive greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emission-reducing measures are urgently needed. Important emission-reduction measures mainly include carbon trading and low-carbon cost subsidies. Comprehensive consideration of these two policies is a research hotspot in the field of low-carbon technology investment. Based on this background, this paper considers the impact of consumer low-carbon preferences on market demand and the impact of uncertainty in carbon emission-reduction behaviour. We construct a stochastic differential game model with upstream and downstream enterprises based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy. From a dynamic perspective, this paper researches the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution characteristics of the joint emission-reduction mechanism in a supply chain. This paper discusses the sensitivity of the parameters and uses numerical simulation to verify the impact of each parameter on the emission-reduction decision-making activities of stakeholders after introducing the cost subsidy. The results show that a cost subsidy policy can promote carbon emission-reduction investment and supply chain profit. Thus, it is important to strengthen technical cooperation and exchange among enterprises.

Highlights

  • Low-carbon economy is an inevitable choice for the sustainable development of global economy

  • Developing low-carbon economy is conducive to breaking through the bottleneck constraints of resources and environment in the process of economic development and taking the new road of industrialization; it is conducive to forming a sound policy mechanism and institutional guarantee system to promote sustainable development; it is conducive to promoting industrial upgrading and technological innovation of enterprises and building the future international core competitiveness of enterprises

  • Under the background of economic globalization, supply chain enterprises can only improve their competitiveness and achieve the goal of sustainable development by formulating specific strategies and measures based on the perspective of sustainable development

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Summary

Introduction

Low-carbon economy is an inevitable choice for the sustainable development of global economy. Under the background of carbon emission trading and cost subsidies, and considering the low-carbon preferences of consumers and the randomness of the emission-reduction process, this paper uses a stochastic differential game method to analyse the game relationships between the government, manufacturers, retailers, and consumers under cost-sharing coordination from a dynamic perspective. Han et al established a game model to study the decision-making behaviour of manufacturers in a low-carbon e-commerce supply chain that received government carbon subsidies that considered fairness [28]. Considering a scenario of a carbon trading market with a cost subsidy, this paper comprehensively analyses consumers’ low-carbon preferences and random factors in the process of carbon emission reduction It obtains the optimal equilibrium strategy and evolution path for joint carbon emission reduction by manufacturers and retailers

Stochastic Differential Game Model
Equilibrium Strategy
Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity Analysis
Conclusions
Full Text
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