Supply Chain Decision-Making Based on Warehouse Receipt Pledge and Risk Consideration under Twice Ordering Mode

Abstract

This paper studies supply chain decisions making between the retailer, supplier, and bank based on warehouse receipt pledge and risk consideration under twice ordering mode. The decentralized supply chain and centralized supply chain are divided by whether the supplier provides repurchase guarantees and whether the retailer offers revenue sharing. We develop a Stackelberg game model to analyze the influential mechanism among various actors and use the method of downside risk control to discuss the bank’s expected loss and the optimal loan pledge ratio. We carry out a simulation analysis, and the result is shown as follows: (i) either for decentralized or centralized supply chain, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the optimal proportion that the number of goods pledged by the retailer’s twice ordering accounts for the number of first-ordering goods are all unique; (ii) the bank’s loan pledge ratio is a monotonically increasing function of disposal value of the unit remaining commodity; (iii) for centralized supply chain, the bank’s loan pledge ratio is the monotonically increasing function of repurchase ratio and wholesale price provided by the supplier, respectively; (iv) in the decentralized supply chain, the supplier’s return mainly comes from the wholesale revenue and is positively related to the wholesale volume and wholesale price; in the centralized supply chain, the supplier’s return is mainly from the retailer’s revenue sharing.