Abstract
In this paper three unlike coordinating contracts namely (i) joint rebate contract (ii) wholesale price discount contract and (iii) cost sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under stock and price induced demand. It is found analytically that the manufacturer׳s and the retailer׳s preferences among three contractual forms are not always aligned. By applying bargaining theory, it is established that stock elasticity plays an important role to select coordination contract and a threshold value stock elasticity is also determined, below which cost sharing contract is not feasible. It is also found that the retailer with higher bargaining power always prefers wholesale price discount contract among considered three contracts. Results are illustrated analytically as well as numerically.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
