Abstract
In a supply chain organized as a network of autonomous enterprises, the main objective of each partner is to optimize his production and supply policy with respect to his own economic criterion. Conflicts of interests and the distributed nature of the decision structure may induce a global loss of efficiency. Contracts can then be used to improve global performance and decrease risks. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the efficiency of different types of contracts between the industrial partners of a supply chain. Such an evaluation is made on the basis of the relationship between a producer facing a random demand and a supplier with a random lead-time. The model combines queuing theory for evaluation aspects and game theory for decisional purposes.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
More From: Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.