Supply and demand behaviors in the Chinese emission allowances pledge credit market under different value type: An evolutionary game analysis

Abstract

Chinese Emission Allowances (CEAs) pledge credit provides a new way for banks to reduce green credit risks and for low-carbon enterprises to improve the credit availability. However, insufficient supply and demand is the main dilemma of CEAs pledge credit in China. One of the reasons for this dilemma may be the neglect of the forward value of CEAs in value assessment. This research explores the decision-making behavior of the supply and demand subjects in the CEAs pledge credit market under different value types of CEAs. First, the improved B–S options pricing model with consideration of transaction costs is used in the construction of the payoff matrix to measure the option value of CEAs. The new matrix aims to place both the option value (corresponding to forward value) and the market value (corresponding to spot value) in the CEAs pledge value evaluation framework. Then, based on the new matrix, an evolutionary game model between key emission enterprises (KEEs) and commercial banks (CBs) is built to dynamically analyze the equilibrium state of supply and demand as well as the strategic interaction of participants in CEAs pledge credit market. Finally, numerical simulations demonstrate the driving factors of supply and demand for CEAs pledge credit. The research results show that compared to market value, the option value of CEAs is more conducive to stimulating the supply and demand of CEA pledge credit; and the shorter the remaining valid period of CEAs, the higher the participation enthusiasm of supply and demand parties. Furthermore, reducing low-carbon technology risks and increasing the carbon emissions trading prices at the end of pledge period can significantly improve the supply and demand of CEAs pledge credit, but the loan and deposit interest rates of CEAs pledge credit are ineffective.