Supervision of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Production and the Independence of Regulators as a Response to Major Accidents

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the reforms of offshore oil and gas (O&G) regulators in the United Kingdom (the UK), Norway, the United States of America (the USA), and the Netherlands after major accidents in the industry. The reforms introduced a measure to make regulators more independent, and to avoid conflicts of interest by separating economic and risk regulation. This research calls such measure “the functional separation criterion”. In order to identify what makes a regulator independent, this research goes beyond the offshore O&G industry to analyze the theory of independent regulators developed in the field of public administration. This approach evidences that, in contrast to the understanding of independent regulators used in the offshore O&G industry, the independence of regulators in the field of public administration is a multidimensional concept. A multidimensional assessment of the independence of offshore O&G regulators reveals findings that remain hidden if one uses a single and limited approach such as the functional separation criterion.