Supervision mechanism for pollution behavior of Chinese enterprises based on haze governance

Abstract

Abstract In recent years, severe haze issue has affected every Chinese citizen and it has been attracting more and more attention from both researchers and practitioners. Enterprise is viewed as the culprits causing the haze, and so, it is also an important subject for preventing haze. The aim of the study is to find a government supervision mechanism that can encourage companies to actively prevent haze. Using evolutionary game, two kinds of government's supervision mechanisms are established, namely, “Centralized supervision” and “Long-term regulation”. The conclusion shows that “Long-term regulation” is better than “Centralized supervision”. Because long-term regulation has lower management costs and broader management scope in the long run. And the larger the ratio of the cost of enterprise's abiding by the law to that of violating the law is, the more effective the “Long-term regulation” mechanism will be. As long-term regulatory mechanisms are required to pre-set air quality thresholds, government agencies should promptly adjust the value and make it public. In addition, increasing the initial proportion of enterprises complying with the law is crucial for supervision. And government should create an external environment to encourage enterprises to comply with laws.